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Based on indicators of the authoritarian behavior of political leaders developed by 
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), this paper examines the political discourse, stances, and 
attitudes of Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil, during his first two years in office. 
The research uses a qualitative case study approach centered on literature review, 
with emphasis on chapters of books and journal articles, as well as news reports for 
an empirical observation of the behavior of the president of Brazil concerning rules 
and institutions of democracy. The essentially authoritarian behavior of Bolsonaro 
signals a trend toward democratic regression in Brazil; however, it is not technically 
correct to affirm that Brazil is already being governed through an authoritarian 
regime.
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RESUMEN
Basándose en los indicadores del comportamiento autoritario de líderes políticos 
desarrollados por Levitsky y Ziblatt (2018), el autor del artículo examina el discurso 
político, la postura y las actitudes del presidente de Brasil, Jair Bolsonaro, en los dos 
primeros años de ejercicio de su mandato. La investigación utiliza un estudio de caso 
con un enfoque cualitativo basado en la revisión bibliográfica, con un énfasis en los 
capítulos de libros y artículos científicos, así como los materiales periodísticos, para 
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permitir una observación empírica de la conducta del presidente brasileño frente a las 
instituciones y las normas democráticas. Se observa que Bolsonaro en realidad tiene 
un comportamiento autoritario, que señala una tendencia de regresión democrática 
en Brasil, aunque técnicamente no es correcto afirmar que el país ya esté bajo un 
régimen autoritario.
PALABRAS CLAVE: democracia, autoritarismo, Brasil, Bolsonaro.
Introduction
Based on a set of key indicators of authoritarian behavior of political leaders, 
as developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), this article examines the political 
discourse, stances, and attitudes of the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, du-
ring his first two years in office, which began in January 2019. This time frame 
does not include the period of more than two decades that Bolsonaro spent 
as a congressman, nor his campaign-based declarations. Instead, it focuses on 
his performance as president to verify whether he can be classified as authori-
tarian under the adopted model.
This research takes part in the debate about the onset of a new global wave 
of authoritarianism, either in countries with an already consolidated tradition 
of democracy, or where the democratic process is still gathering momentum. 
Brazil, whose re-democratization process took place in the 1980s, after two 
decades of military dictatorship, is currently in the second category. Contrary 
to what has traditionally taken place in the 20th century in Latin America, 
when authoritarian systems generally came to power through violence and 
State-based military coups, many contemporary societies have witnessed the 
rise of leaders with authoritarian behavior legitimized through popular vote. 
Once elected and able to exercise their power, they start to systematically vio-
late the rules of democracy.
This article focuses on the following research question: Is it possible to 
formally categorize the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, as a political leader 
with authoritarian behavior? In this respect and based on the test for autho-
ritarianism proposed by the aforementioned authors, the general objective of 
this article is to critically analyze the period of two years that Jair Bolsonaro 
served so far as the president of Brazil. Note that due to the limitations of this 
research, it is not possible to proceed to a profound analysis on the entire ran-
ge of political phenomena usually associated with authoritarianism, such as 
populism or democratic regression; however, these topics may still be briefly 
addressed throughout this text.
In terms of relevance, this article aims to contribute to the set of observa-
tions concerning the current situation and the paths of democracy in Brazil, 
which – due to its geographic dimensions and regional economic weight – 
levies an additional impact on its Latin American neighbors. This research is 
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further justified by the currency of the core material, enabling an empirical 
observation of the behavior of the president of Brazil concerning rules and 
institutions of democracy during his first two years in office.
Even though there is academic research in political science that exami-
nes the start of the Bolsonaro mandate, the literature review has not found 
any previous study using the theoretical framework proposed here. Neto and 
Pimenta (2020) analyze the first year of Jair Bolsonaro’s role as president, but 
through a comparative approach to two other presidential periods: Jânio Qua-
dros (from January to August 1961) and Fernando Collor (from March 1990 
to December 1992). As a result, the authors declare that despite Bolsonaro 
having experienced what appears to be a level of conflict similar to that of 
the presidents mentioned above during his first year in office, the distincti-
ve characteristics of Bolsonaro’s mandate center on his intimate relationship 
with the leaders of the Armed Forces and the solid support of the conservative 
evangelical electorate.
Methodologically, this research was carried out employing a case study 
delimited on a geographical and chronological basis but focused on unders-
tanding a more complex and comprehensive phenomenon: the growth of ins-
titutional authoritarian manifestations in democratic systems. A qualitative 
approach was adopted based on bibliographical research and through a spe-
cific emphasis on the work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) but also supported 
by chapters from other books and journal articles, in addition to using news 
reports available on the internet to verify the practical validity of each of the 
indicators of authoritarian behavior. This case study has predominantly empi-
rical-descriptive characteristics, focused on assessing the elected case within 
its actual context: the first two years of Jair Bolsonaro’s mandate as the presi-
dent of Brazil.
Democracy and authoritarianism
At a factual level, the analysis undertaken in this research looks at the behavior 
of a specific political leader, elected according to the rules of a democratic sys-
tem but with overtones of supposedly authoritarian conduct. In this scenario, 
understanding the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism (in addition 
to the hybrid competitive authoritarianism regime) is fundamental for the ob-
jectives of this article.
In general terms, this article adopts the concept of representative demo-
cracy advocated by the pluralist theoretical model currently prevalent in con-
temporary political science, which among its principal exponents includes 
Robert Dahl, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Charles Lindblom (Smith, 
1997). This theoretical approach is founded on the basis of society with mul-
tiple centers of power – not just the exclusive exercising of power by a specific 




political participation by its citizens in electing their chosen representatives 
(Costa, 2007).
Democracy, according to Dahl (1989), is a governing system that meets the 
following seven primordial conditions: i) “elected officials”; ii) “free and fair elec-
tions”; iii) “inclusive suffrage”; iv) “right to run for office”; v) “freedom of expres-
sion”; vi) “alternative information”; and vii) “associational autonomy” (p. 221). 
More recently, Levitsky and Way (2010) added another attribute: “the existence of 
a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition” (p. 5).
According to Linz (1964), authoritarianism is a political system 
with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and 
guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor ex-
tensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and 
in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within for-
mally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. (p. 297)
Somewhere between these two concepts, there is a kind of hybrid autho-
ritarianism that is discussed in the works of Levitsky and Way (2010), which 
presents characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism described as com-
petitive authoritarianism. In this system, there are legal and relatively effecti-
ve channels allowing opposition parties to compete for power, with elections 
being held regularly in which opposition parties are not legally prevented 
from competing. However, one of the distinctive characteristics of this sys-
tem, even though democratic institutions are respected enough to enable real 
competition, is that they can be violated in such a manner that competition is 
often unfair, with opposition parties being impaired from seriously challen-
ging those in power. The authors’ examples concerning the absence of material 
equality for competition-based conditions are disparities in financial resour-
ces and insufficient access to the media.
Note that the aforementioned concepts do not necessarily signify a claim 
to a hermetic and inflexible definition of democracy and authoritarianism, but 
instead a perception of its principal characteristic elements. Due to their com-
plex socio-political phenomena, these elements must always be interpreted 
by those who take part, their individual circumstances, and the periods over 
which they occur.
Through this conceptual framework, it is possible to classify the Brazi-
lian government system as democratic, even though it is not necessarily a fu-
lly consolidated democracy. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2021), Brazil is classified as a “flawed democracy,” which is currently positio-
ned in its annual ranking system in 49th place out of a total of 167 countries1. 
1  According to the democracy index of The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021), there are 
four democratic quality classifications, listed in descending order: full democracies, flawed de-
mocracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.
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In turn, the most recent report from the V-Dem Institute (2021) classifies the 
Brazilian system as an “electoral democracy”2 but also makes repeated war-
nings about Brazil being on a democratic decline. According to this document 
(p. 19), among the ten countries that have “autocratized” the most over the last 
decade, there are once-stable democracies such as Poland (1st), Hungary (2nd), 
Turkey (3rd), Brazil (4th), Serbia (5th) and India (7th).
Democracy in Brazil – or any other part of the world – cannot be classified 
as an absolutely assured achievement free from setbacks or downturns and, as 
such, immune to an authoritarian jolt. The fact that Brazil has not achieved 
full democratic consolidation further emphasizes this risk.
The process of slowly and gradually losing democratic quality – especia-
lly about “competitive electoral procedures, civil and political liberties, and 
accountability” – is characteristic of democratic backsliding (Lust & Wald-
ner, 2015, p. 2). This phenomenon has been the subject of studies by multiple 
authors in recent years, with subtle terminological distinctions such as demo-
cratic recession or democratic regression (Diamond, 2015, 2021), democratic 
decline (Plattner, 2015), democratic decay (Daly, 2019), and de-democratiza-
tion (Enyedi, 2016). This particular case study is based on this precept, sup-
ported by the recent work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).
Test for authoritarianism – indicators of authoritarian 
behavior applied to the case of President Bolsonaro
Inspired by the studies of Linz (1978), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) developed 
the following set of four key indicators of authoritarian behavior by political 
leaders that potentially put democracy at risk: “1) rejects, in words or action, 
the democratic rules of the game, 2) denies the legitimacy of opponents, 3) to-
lerates or encourages violence, or 4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil 
liberties of opponents, including the media” (p. 18). Table 1 contains a number 
of questions to be considered as a test for authoritarianism.
Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules 
of the game
Application of this test for authoritarianism in relation to President Bolsonaro 
begins with an affirmative response to question 1.a (Do they reject the Cons-
titution or express a willingness to violate it?).
The Brazilian president has already expressed a willingness to violate 
the Brazilian Constitution by endorsing the Armed Forces’ potential inter-
2  According to the V-Dem Institute (2021), there are four classifications of democratic 





Four key indicators of 
authoritarian behavior
1. Rejection of (or 
weak commitment 
to) democratic rules 
of the game
a) Do they reject the Constitution or express a willingness to 
violate it? 
b) Do they suggest a need for antidemocratic measures, 
such as canceling elections, violating or suspending the 
Constitution, banning certain organizations, or restricting 
basic civil or political rights? 
c) Do they seek to use (or endorse the use of) 
extraconstitutional means to change the government, such 
as military coups, violent insurrections, or mass protests 
aimed at forcing a change in the government? 
d) Do they attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections, 
for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral results?
2. Denial of the 
legitimacy of 
political opponents
a) Do they describe their rivals as subversive, or opposed to 
the existing constitutional order? 
b) Do they claim that their rivals constitute an existential 
threat, either to national security or to the prevailing way 
of life? 
c) Do they baselessly describe their partisan rivals as 
criminals, whose supposed violation of the law (or 
potential to do so) disqualifies them from full participation 
in the political arena? 
d) Do they baselessly suggest that their rivals are foreign 
agents, in that they are secretly working in alliance with (or 
the employ of) a foreign government— usually an enemy 
one?
3. Toleration or 
encouragement of 
violence
a) Do they have any ties to armed gangs, paramilitary forces, 
militias, guerrillas, or other organizations that engage in 
illicit violence? 
b) Have they or their partisan allies sponsored or encouraged 
mob attacks on opponents? 
c) Have they tacitly endorsed violence by their supporters by 
refusing to unambiguously condemn it and punish it? 
d) Have they praised (or refused to condemn) other 
significant acts of political violence, either in the past or 
elsewhere in the world?
4. Readiness to curtail 
civil liberties of 
opponents, including 
media
a) Have they supported laws or policies that restrict civil 
liberties, such as expanded libel or defamation laws or laws 
restricting protest, criticism of the government, or certain 
civic or political organizations? 
b) Have they threatened to take legal or other punitive action 
against critics in rival parties, civil society, or the media? 
c) Have they praised repressive measures taken by other 
governments, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?
Source: adapted from Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, pp. 18–19).
89
Indicators of Authoritarian 
Behavior of Political Leaders.  
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
vention in the event of a political dispute between the branches of power, 
known among his supporters as “military intervention.” In a ministerial 
meeting recorded on video, which subsequently went public, Bolsonaro, 
who had been in conflict with the Federal Supreme Court (STF) due to 
authorized criminal investigations into his sons, stated that he could tri-
gger Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution3, including the possibility 
that the Armed Forces could reestablish order. This is a distorted and un-
sustainable interpretation of the constitutional provision, which started 
with blog posts on the internet and was subsequently rejected by Brazil’s 
principal jurists as equivalent to predicting the own constitutional order’s 
breakdown (G1, 2020, June 2). In reality, the article deals with the orga-
nization and duties of the Armed Forces and not the relationship or the 
separation of the government powers.
In terms of question 1.b (Do they suggest a need for antidemocratic mea-
sures, such as canceling elections, violating or suspending the Constitution, 
banning certain organizations, or restricting basic civil or political rights?), 
the response is equally affirmative, specifically concerning the mitigation of 
the fundamental rights of expression of thought and the ability to meet in lo-
cations open to the general public, as enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution4.
In recent popular pro-democracy and anti-government demonstrations, 
Bolsonaro called such demonstrators “addicts,” “thugs” and “terrorists” (Pú-
blico, 2020, June 5), in addition to threatening to use the National Public Se-
curity Force – consisting of police officers subordinate to the Ministry of Jus-
tice – against activities that could be identified as anti-fascist (Deutsche Welle, 
2020, June 5).
Item 1.c (Do they seek to use [or endorse the use of] extra-constitutional 
means to change the government, such as military coups, violent insurrections 
or mass protests aimed at forcing a change in the government?), which also 
has an affirmative response, illustrates Bolsonaro’s endorsement and admira-
tion to the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–1985), something recurring 
throughout his parliamentary career.
3  Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (CFRB), Article 142, caput: “The Armed 
Forces, comprised of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national 
institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of 
the President of the Republic, and are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee 
of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order” (Senado 
Federal, 2013, p. 85).
4  CFRB, Article 5: “All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, 
Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, 
to liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: (...) IV – the expression 
of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden; (...) XVI – all persons may hold peaceful meet-
ings, without weapons, in places open to the public, regardless of authorization provided that 
they do not frustrate another meeting previously called for the same place, subject only to prior 




In a symptomatic manner, amid popular protests in his support, banners 
and posters have been raised exalting Institutional Act No. 5 (AI–5), a decree 
from 1968 that inaugurated the darkest and most violent decade of the dic-
tatorship, which repealed mandates served by members of the opposition, 
suspended constitutional guarantees, and led to the institutionalized torture 
of opponents to the system, plus having other harmful consequences. Such 
protests and demonstrations stemmed from tensions between Bolsonaro 
and the then President of the House of Representatives, Rodrigo Maia, with 
the most prominent of these taking place in front of the Army Headquarters 
in Brasilia, with Bolsonaro being present himself in an address to demons-
trators (Exame, 2020, April 19). At no moment in time did he rebuke the 
praise of AI–5.
Ultimately, the response to question 1.d (Do they attempt to undermine 
the legitimacy of elections, for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral 
results?) is also affirmative. The Brazilian electoral system, although it could 
still be improved, is internationally recognized for its efficiency, safety, and 
transparency in the way that it promotes elections and discloses its results. 
There are no records of any fraud linked to the use of electronic ballot boxes, 
implemented more than two decades ago and having been used on an inte-
rrupted basis since then. This was pointed out, for example, by the Electoral 
Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (EOM/OAS) du-
ring the 2018 presidential elections (OAS, 2018).
Bolsonaro, however, fielded the theory – which was vastly disseminated 
across the Brazilian extreme right – that the electronic voting system used 
throughout Brazil is not reliable or trustworthy. On that occasion, in a speech 
to Brazilian supporters in Miami (USA), he stated that he had proof that elec-
tronic ballot boxes were frauded during the 2018 presidential election and that 
he apparently would have received enough votes to be elected during the first 
round of voting (the election was effectively decided after the second round of 
voting) (BBC, 2020, March 10). Despite this serious and hard-hitting declara-
tion, he never presented any form of proof.
It is indeed symptomatic that Bolsonaro remained faithful to the false 
allegations of fraud made by Donald Trump during the presidential elec-
tions of the United States, having been the last president of the countries that 
comprise G20 – the forum that brings together the world’s most important 
economies – to congratulate Joe Biden on his election victory. He only did so 
a day after the Electoral College endorsed the election result (El País, 2020, 
December 15).
Such examples satisfactorily demonstrate Bolsonaro’s lack of compromi-
se to the rules of democracy. This type of public stance has occurred when 
being pressured by public opinion or other political actors, which is natu-
ral in democratic systems but has resulted in clashes and even institutional 
crises, making the Brazilian president’s authoritarian penchants even more 
evident.
91
Indicators of Authoritarian 
Behavior of Political Leaders.  
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents
At this point, although less frequently, Bolsonaro’s behavioral patterns are 
consistent with indicators of authoritarianism.
The affirmative response to item 2.a (Do they describe their rivals as subver-
sive or opposed to the existing constitutional order?) reemphasizes the manner in 
which the president of Brazil treats his political rivals, such as the governor of the 
State of Maranhão, Flávio Dino, a member the Brazilian Communist Party (PC-
doB). During a recent inauguration of federal government infrastructure works in 
this state, Bolsonaro, in addition to not inviting the state governor himself – con-
trary to institutional practice – affirmed during the event that communism would 
soon be eradicated from Brazil. That very same week, he had stated to supporters 
in Brasilia: “We have to remove the PCdoB from there, man, for God’s sake. It’s 
only here in Brazil that communists declare that they are democrats” (Congresso 
em Foco, 2020, October 29). This last statement, incidentally, reveals the strategy 
of leveling an accusation of being undemocratic on political opponents, a tactic 
that he started to use as an attempt to distance himself from the same image.
In terms of question 2.b (Do they claim that their rivals constitute an existential 
threat, either to national security or to the prevailing way of life?), the authorita-
rian behavior of Bolsonaro is emphasized through the use of the National Security 
Law (Planalto, 1983) in relation to critical speeches directed at the government. 
This type of law dates back to the military dictatorship but remains in force, either 
because no other law has expressly revoked it or because the STF has never jud-
ged its compliance with the new constitutional order initiated in 1988. Making 
the most of the legal nature of this fact, Bolsonaro used this law to threaten ex-
President Lula (Deutsche Welle, 2019, November 21), as well as ministers of his 
government have been using it as the legal basis to legally sue journalists and even 
one of the STF Ministers, Gilmar Mendes (Carta Capital, 2020, July 24).
Toleration or encouragement of violence
Here, as in the previous subsections, the behavior of the Brazilian president 
once again fits into the indicators proposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).
In terms of item 3.a (Do they have any ties to armed gangs, paramilitary 
forces, militias, guerrillas or other organizations that engage in illicit violen-
ce?), Bolsonaro and his sons (one of these being a Federal Senator who is un-
der criminal investigation for such a crime), in addition to having intimate 
connections with members of armed militias (El País, 2020, June 20), adopts 
a form of discourse that actually supports the actions of these criminals5. 
5  In terms of the current situation in Brazil, militias are criminal organizations that mostly 
consist of members or ex-members of security forces (police, firefighters, and members of the 




The political scientist Bruno Paes Manso – a scholar on the subject – reveals 
glimpses of this ideological connection to Bolsonaro’s rhetoric, which embo-
dies “the concept of breakdown imposed by force, of reinventing politics by 
means of an authority that will impose itself and restore traditional values 
through violence, even if the law is disregarded during the process” (Deutsche 
Welle, 2020, October 7).
In relation to question 1.b (Have they or their partisan allies sponsored or 
encouraged mob attacks on opponents?), Bolsonaro, from a context of rhetori-
cal clashes with state governors over the accuracy of the statistics on the sick and 
dead caused by COVID-19, encouraged his supporters to enter public hospitals 
to physically check the usage of beds (IstoÉ, 2020, June 12). As a result, there 
were incidences of invasion and depredation of hospitals that very same day, 
even in wards restricted to doctors and patients (Exame, 2020, June 12).
The analysis of the item 1.d (Have they praised [or refused to condemn] 
other significant acts of political violence, either in the past or elsewhere in the 
world?) once again emphasizes Bolsonaro’s predilection for dictatorial systems 
and their methods. In response to criticism from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, whose father was im-
prisoned, tortured, and killed at the beginning of the Chilean dictatorship of 
Augusto Pinochet (1973 to 1990), the Brazilian president made a post on the 
internet declaring that Chile “failed to turn into another Cuba thanks to those 
who had the courage to put a stop to the left in 1973, with her father, a briga-
dier at the time, being one of these communists” (Veja, 2019, September 4).
A month beforehand, Bolsonaro had extolled the deceased colonel Bril-
hante Ustra, ex-leader of the Detachment of Information Operations – Center 
for Internal Defense Operations (DOI-CODI), a political repression organi-
zation of the Brazilian military dictatorship, as a “national hero.” According to 
the National Truth Commission (2011–2014), Ustra was directly or indirectly 
responsible for the torture and murder of dozens of political prisoners when 
he was in charge of this organization from 1970 to 1974 (G1, 2019, August 8).
Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, 
including media
Additionally, mitigation of civil liberties was highly evident during the first 
two years of Bolsonaro’s rule, thus responding in the affirmative to the three 
questions set out in this subsection. 
In line with the rhetoric of the president of Brazil against protests in the 
street, there has been a significant increase in bills made by the National Con-
extortions and carry out other illicit activities under the pretense of helping to combat drug 
trafficking or other types of offenses, with concentrated activity in the Brazilian state of Rio de 
Janeiro (Congresso em Foco, 2019, December 23).
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gress aimed at restricting fundamental constitutional rights of expression of 
thought and the ability to meet in places open to the public. This fact brings 
about question 4.a (Have they supported laws or policies that restrict civil li-
berties, such as expanded libel or defamation laws or laws restricting protest, 
criticism of the government, or certain civic or political organizations?).
One of these legislative proposals, initiated by the Bolsonaro government, 
amplifies cases of exclusion of illegality for the potential coming into force 
of a decree for the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), i.e., assignments of 
the Armed Forces over a limited period, exclusively determined by express 
order of the Presidency of the Republic, in cases where traditional public se-
curity forces are insufficient. Under the pretext of curbing violent popular 
demonstrations, this bill increases the likelihood that security services (poli-
ce, firefighters, or military personnel in the Armed Forces) could be exempt 
from criminal punishment if their conduct is considered to be in self-defense 
(Agência Brasil, 2019, November 25).
Among the other proposals aimed at mitigating popular demonstrations 
(it is estimated that of the 70 passed so far through the National Congress, 
21 were presented in 2019 alone), the most prominent are as follows: crimi-
nalizing the use of masks and the blocking of streets; increasing penalties for 
crimes of being in contempt of the police; permission by the police – with 
no judicial authorization – to monitor people through genetic mapping and 
private messages on social networks, in addition to infiltrating agents and in-
tercepting telephone calls; and, classifying acts of violence based on political 
and ideological motivation as crimes of terrorism (Folha de S. Paulo, 2020, 
January 10).
Relative to point 4.b (Have they threatened to take legal or other puniti-
ve action against critics in rival parties, civil society, or the media?), Bolso-
naro has directed numerous threats at the press, with which he has regular 
skirmishes.
On more than one occasion, the Brazilian president declared that televi-
sion broadcasters who convey the news to supposedly destabilize him would 
have difficulties when it comes to the renewal process of respective public con-
cessions for broadcasting services for sound and images. One of his preferred 
targets is Rede Globo (Globo Network), the leading private television broad-
caster in Brazil, to whom Bolsonaro has referred to as the “gutter press, gar-
bage,” and whose concession is required to be renewed in 2022, the final year 
of his presidential mandate. Non-renewal of the Globo Network concession is 
a banner frequently seen at demonstrations held by the president’s supporters 
(Congresso em Foco, 2020, April 30; IstoÉ, 2019, October 29).
Ultimately, in the same way as the two previous passages in this subsection, 
the response to item 4.c (Have they praised repressive measures taken by other 
governments, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?) is also affirmative. 
To provide yet another example of Bolsonaro’s devotion to the Brazilian dic-




was “commemorated” via a bulk message campaign on WhatsApp through an 
electronic account of the Communication Secretariat of the Presidency, con-
sisting of a two-minute-long video in which the presenter recounted his own 
version of Brazilian history, where the military saved Brazil from a supposedly 
communist dominion. The account from which this information was dissemi-
nated is intended to be used for federal government public utility, news, and 
service-based messages (UOL, 2019, March 31).
A young democracy facing the authoritarian threat
After the result of the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil, there was hope 
among politicians and opposition voters alike that Bolsonaro’s aggressive and 
undemocratic attitude would not be put into practice after taking office. As 
such, the required liturgy of the role would naturally moderate the future 
president’s potential authoritarian outbursts. It can be affirmed that any such 
expectation did not come to fruition.
Relying on popular approval that – minus a few exceptions – had oscillated 
between 30 and 40 percent (CNI-IBOPE, 2020; Datafolha, 2021), involving 
the backing of relevant private initiative sectors (e.g., the financial market), 
a strong link with personnel from the Armed Forces, the solid support of con-
servative evangelicals and a divided and weakened opposition, instead of slac-
kening his authoritarian behavior, Bolsonaro went on to exacerbate it.
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) emphasize in their body of work that a power-
ful politician’s fulfillment of even one of the indicators discussed above would 
be enough to inspire concern over the integrity of democracy. Thus, we can 
determine that Bolsonaro’s attitudes are affirmative to nearly all of the tested 
items, emphasizing the danger faced by Brazilian democracy under his rule. 
In addition to the obvious risks of democratic backsliding through his direct 
activities, there is also the collateral effect on other spheres of power, including 
an increase in politicians with similar or even greater authoritarian tendencies.
Based on the aforementioned indicators and in response to the original 
question of whether the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, can be formally 
classified as a political leader with authoritarian behavior, the answer is cer-
tainly affirmative. The qualitative approach used in this article makes it diffi-
cult to provide a precise estimate of the degree of regression experienced by 
Brazilian democracy since the election of Bolsonaro, but it does confirm that 
there has been a move in this direction. However, according to the concepts 
described in the second section of this article, it cannot be upheld that Brazil 
is effectively under an authoritarian regime.
In spite of imperfections, Brazilian democracy retains certain attributes 
that underline its resilience. Important sectors of civil society remain orga-
nized, the Judiciary branch of power is independent, there is a robust insti-
tutional apparatus for the protection of rights – with emphasis on the Public 
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Ministry – and the press retains a good measure of freedom (Daly, 2019). Re-
silient democratic institutions are pointed out as one of the major defenses 
of Western societies against the recently emerging authoritarian forces and 
the democratic backsliding (Norris, 2017). The capacity of these multiple ele-
ments to successfully operate is decisive for the vitality of the Brazilian demo-
cracy in the future.
Conclusions
This article constitutes an effort to understand the concepts of democracy and 
authoritarianism on the basis of the framework of authoritarian behavioral 
indicators of political leaders, as established by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), 
having been applied in a clear and systematic manner for the case in question: 
the first two years of the rule of Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil.
Taking the core question into account, it has been empirically verified that 
the Brazilian president adopts political discourse, stances, and attitudes of an 
authoritarian nature, emphasizing a tendency for democratic regression in 
Brazil, but it is still not technically accurate to affirm that the situation has 
degenerated into an authoritarian regime.
Through a qualitative analysis of the democratic regression observed in 
Brazil or through the impacts of the revisionist and obscurantist stance of the 
president of Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is definitely more 
room for further in-depth investigations into the central topic of this article, 
plus further analysis of the subject matter that surrounds it.
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